HHS Ebola Panel Report

Findings of the Independent Panel

1. The lack of strong leadership and response coordination from WHO hindered HHS and international response efforts.

2. The U.S. government was not well prepared to respond to emergent crises that require a rapid, integrated domestic and international response.

3. The U.S. government did not use all coordination elements of the National Response Framework during the Ebola response.

4. HHS did not apply existing pandemic plans and coordination mechanisms during the Ebola response.

5. HHS’s early communications did not demonstrate an appreciation of the public’s perceptions and fear, or discuss the possibility of isolated U.S. Ebola cases.

6. In the initial months of the crisis, the U.S. government was not prepared to deploy response personnel at the scale or rate required for the Ebola epidemic.

7. Differing perspectives on the most appropriate ways to use and evaluate investigational vaccines and treatments contributed to incomplete evaluation of the efficacy of these products.

8. The U.S. government did not anticipate the complications associated with establishing domestic Ebola Treatment Centers and other domestic preparedness measures.

9. Screening passengers at selected U.S. airports enabled local authorities to identify and monitor individuals who might have been exposed to Ebola.

10. The Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise collaborated to expedite research, development, manufacturing, and provision of Ebola vaccines and treatments.

11. HHS initially had difficulty developing credible guidance for, and ensuring an adequate supply of, personal protective equipment for healthcare workers.

12. Federal, state, and local governments applied different—and, at times, conflicting—policies and authorities for specific response measures, such as waste management and quarantine.

13. HHS is not configured or funded to respond to a prolonged public health or medical emergency overseas or at home.